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NEW AXIOMS IN SET THEORY
GIORGIO VENTURI AND MATTEO VIALE
Abstract. In this article we review the present situation in the foun-
dations of set theory, discussing two programs meant to overcome the
undecidability results, such as the independence of the continuum hy-
pothesis; these programs are centered, respectively, on forcing axioms
and Woodin’s V = Ultimate-L conjecture. While doing so, we briefly
introduce the key notions of set theory.
Introduction
On January 6th, 1918, Georg Cantor passed away in Halle, after a life
dedicated to the construction of the mathematical theory of infinity. After
one hundred years his heritage is very much alive and set theory has reached
a remarkable complexity of techniques and ideas. Not only set theory proved
to be a useful tool in solving problems from different mathematical fields,
but the conceptual sophistication of its development remained faithful to
the philosophical importance of its creation.
Rendering infinity a trustful mathematical concept was not an easy task
for Cantor [7], who was opposed on both mathematical and philosophi-
cal grounds by important intellectual figures, like Kronecker, who famously
stated that “God created the natural numbers, all else is the work of man”
[25], meaning that human understanding cannot go beyond the infinity of
the collection of all natural numbers. However the progressive use of in-
finitary methods by mathematicians of the caliber of Weierstrass, Riemann
and Dedekind paved the way to Cantor’s mathematization of the infinite
and his creation of set theory. Then, the true mathematical coronation hap-
pened in 1900 when Hilbert, during his famous Paris lecture [27], setting
the mathematical agenda for the opening century, placed the solution of
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis as the first of his twenty-three problems1.
Throughout his life Hilbert remained a strong supporter of Cantor’s ideas,
promising, in his famous 1925 paper On the infinite, that: “No one shall
expel us from the paradise which Cantor has created for us”.
The development of the mathematical theory of infinity was not only a
story of success. In 1901, the discovery of Russell’s paradox shook at the
very base the entire edifice of mathematics, casting shadows on the coherence
and thus the importance of infinity in mathematics. What became clear
after that discovery was the existing gap between the rules that govern the
1For a well detailed history of set theory see [16].
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infinite and those that govern the finite. Therefore it became imperative to
lay down the right coherent laws that determine a correct use of infinity in
mathematics.
In 1908 Zermelo proposed a careful axiomatization of set theory. Fol-
lowing Hilbert’s enthusiasm in Cantor’s theory —and in the attempt to
justify his use of the Axiom of Choice AC in the proof of the Well-ordering
Theorem— he introduced a first list of axioms. After the contributions of
Fraenkel and von Neumann, this list became the standard axiomatization
of set theory ZFC. By means of ZFC it was possible to avoid the known
paradoxes, but nonetheless many fundamental questions remained opened
for decades; among those Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis CH.
The first fundamental step in the attempt to give a definitive answer to
CH was published in 1938, when Gödel [22] showed its (relative) consistency
with the axioms of ZFC. Almost thirty years later, in 1963, the decidability
of CH on the basis of the ZFC-axioms received a negative answer, when
Cohen [9] established the relative consistency of the failure of CH with ZFC.
Gödel and Cohen’s result showed that CH is undecidable, that is —rephrased
with the proper terminology of mathematical logic— provably independent
with respect to the ZFC-axioms.
Cohen’s fundamental breakthrough, worth a Fields medal, opened a new
era in set theory, both technically and conceptually. The sophistication of
Cohen’s technique allowed to show the undecidability (i.e. independence
relative to ZFC) of many problems remained opened until then. All these
results had the effect of starting a major discussion on the limits of axioma-
tization and on the sharpness of set theoretical concepts, among which that
of infinity.
In this article we review some of the strategies to overcome the intrinsic
limitations of ZFC. Without any ambition of completeness2, we will present
the so-called Gödel’s program, its extension in terms of generic absolute-
ness for second order arithmetic, and its ramifications given, respectively,
by forcing axioms, and by Woodin’s program centered around the construc-
tion of the so-called Ultimate-L. Before that, we briefly introduce the main
definitions and ideas which guided the development of set theory during the
last one and a half century.
The paper is organized as follows: §1 introduces the basic set theoretic
concepts, §2 deals with Cantor’s notion of cardinality and of well-order, §3
deals with the concept of undecidability in mathematics, §4 presents the
strategy of Gödel to overcome the independence phenomenon in set theory,
§5 gives a brief account of the implications of large cardinal axioms on second
order arithmetic, §6 briefly discusses the two research programs meant to
overcome the undecidability of CH.
There is a certain overlap between §1 and §2 of the present paper and §2,
§3, and §4 of Andretta’s article in this issue. The reader of both articles can
2See [56] for a bird-eye view on all approaches that can be found in the literature.
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skim through these sections in either of them or instead take advantage of
the two distinct presentations of these topics.
We tried to make (most of) the paper accessible to readers with a good
training in mathematics at the level of a bachelor degree in mathematics. We
also tried to keep the prerequisites in logic and in set theory to a minimum.
It is our hope that this is the case for the content of §1, §2, §3 (with the
exception of §3.3), §4. Nonetheless we are aware that those who have some
background in logic and/or set theory will greatly benefit of it during their
reading. §5 and §6 will require a steadily increasing familiarity with delicate
and technical set theoretic notions (even though we hope that this does not
preclude the non-expert reader to get the main ideas presented in §5). On
the other hand §3.3 demands a big effort on the reader, and has the aim
of presenting measurable functions as the non-standard instantiation of the
concept of real number given by a certain kind of forcing notion. Familiarity
with the basics of first order logic will simplify this effort; however the reader
may safely skip all of §3.3 without compromising the comprehension of the
subsequent parts of the paper.
1. The universe of all sets
In the rapid development of set theory following the initial astonishing
results of Cantor, it became clear that not only this theory could give a
mathematically precise formulation and justification of the infinitary meth-
ods already widespread in algebra and analysis, but it could also offer a
common framework where to develop all known mathematics [42]. Indeed,
the simple and abstract language of set theory is so versatile that almost ev-
ery mathematical structure can be therein defined and proved to exist. This
peculiar character of set theory is what is normally called the foundational
role of set theory, or, in less ontological terms, its universality.
1.1. Russell’s paradox. The process that led to the formalization of set
theory is full of trials and errors, with successive efforts attempting to caliber
the right expressive power of the theory.
An uncritical attitude towards the laws of logic, at the end of the XIX
century, induced Frege and Dedekind, among many others, to believe that
it was always possible to define a set in terms of a property shared by all
its members; that is, given any well defined property ϕ(x), it is always pos-
sible to form the set {x : ϕ(x)} which is the family of elements x satisfying
the property ϕ(x). This led Frege to propose a foundations of mathemat-
ics entirely based on logic. Unfortunately, this approach was shown to be
inconsistent by Russell, in 1901. Russell’s (in)famous paradox, states that
the set of all objects that do not belong to themselves — which is itself a
well defined property — cannot exist. This is easily shown by the following
argument. Define R = {x : x /∈ x} (where x ∈ y stands for “x is an element
of y”). Assume R is a set, then either R ∈ R or R /∈ R. If R ∈ R, it satisfies
its defining property, i.e. it is a set x which does not belong to itself, yielding
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that R /∈ R. By a similar argument we can also infer that if R /∈ R, then
R ∈ R. Thus we get that R ∈ R if and only if R /∈ R: a contradiction.
1.2. The ZFC-axioms. In order to amend set theory from its paradoxical
consequences, Zermelo decided to collect a list of axioms strong enough
to develop the results obtained by Cantor, but weak enough to avoid any
paradox [64]. Zermelo’s list was later improved by the contributions of
Fraenkel and von Neumann to form the axiom system ZFC.
The basic idea guiding Zermelo’s list of axioms is the following: we need
existence axioms asserting that certain sets, like the natural numbers N, exist
and construction principles able to build new sets from previously given ones;
in order, for example, to construct R from N. On the other hand, Zermelo’s
list of axioms needs to be weak enough to avoid R = {x : ϕ(x)} being a set;
otherwise Russell’s paradox would apply, and set theory, as formalized by
these axioms, would be inconsistent3. The axioms of ZFC are the following4.
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same
elements.
This occurs regardless of how the sets are defined, or of the order by
which their elements are presented. Therefore we get, for example,
the following equalities:
{x : x ∈ Z and x2 − 3x+ 2 = 0} = {1, 2} = {2, 1}.
The above equations show that two sets defined in terms of two
different properties (namely being an integer solution of the equation
x2−3x+2 = 0 or being equal to 1 or 2) are the same, simply because
they have the same elements (moreover the listing of the elements is
irrelevant to decide an equality, as {1, 2} = {2, 1}).
Empty-set: There exists a set with no elements.
This axiom grants that the universe of sets contains something. The
empty set is unique: by extensionality there cannot be two distinct
sets with no element. It is customary to denote with ∅ the empty-set.
Pairing axiom: If X,Y are sets, so is {X,Y }.
Union axiom: If X is a set, so is
⋃
X = {z : z ∈ y for some y ∈ X}.
The pairing axom and the union axiom are basic construction prin-
ciples already sufficient to construct several important sets of finite
size starting from the empty set. Notice that the usual binary union
X ∪ Y can be defined as
⋃
{X,Y }.
3A nice reference text containing the fundamental results of set theory is (among many
others) [28].
4Modulo the unavoidable inaccuracies due to the fact that we sidestep (for lack of
space) the use of first order logic in our presentation of formal systems.
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Separation: If X is a set and φ(x) is a well-defined property5 {x ∈
X : φ(x)} is also a set.
Even though quite similar to Frege’s comprehension principle (as-
serting that {x : φ(x)} is a set for every property φ(x)), Separation
imposes a fundamental restriction on where the elements of the new
set come from: namely they are elements of a set X. Intuitively this
means that, being a set, X transfers to its subsets a label of trust-
fulness for non-contradictory objects. Indeed Separation is weak
enough to avoid any proof of Russell’s paradox from the ZFC-axioms.
Power set: If X is a set then P(X) = {Y : Y ⊆ X} (the set of all
subsets of X) is also a set.
Existence of the natural numbers: There exists an infinite set6.
This axiom is necessary: it is possible to construct a universe of
sets in which all sets are finite (i.e. this axiom does not hold in the
model), while all the other axioms of ZFC are satisfied (see §5.1).
Choice (AC): If {Xi : i ∈ I} is a non-empty set and each Xi is non-
empty for all i ∈ I, we also have that
∏
i∈I Xi is non-empty (i.e.
there is some f : I →
⋃
{Xi : i ∈ I} such that f(i) ∈ Xi for all
i ∈ I).
If I is finite one does not need AC to find an element in the product∏
i∈I Xi. But assume for example x is an accumulation point of
some set A ⊆ R: how do we select inside A a sequence {xn : n ∈ N}
converging to x? AC shows that this is possible by choosing an




(x)) (the latter is the ball in x
of radius 1i+1). There are sets A ⊆ R having accumulation points for
which we cannot prove that such a sequence can be found without
appealing to AC.
Replacement: If X is a set and F (x, y) is a functional property (i.e.
a property for which one can prove that for all sets x there is only one
set y such that F (x, y) holds), then F [X] = {y : ∃x ∈ X F (x, y)}
(the pointwise image of X by F ) is also a set.
Foundation: The binary relation ∈ is well-founded, i.e. there is no
infinite chain {xn : n ∈ N} such that xn+1 ∈ xn for all n.
5It is rather delicate to define properly what it means for a property to be well defined:
the precise definition is that of being expressible in the first order language with a binary
relation symbol for the ∈-relation; see [34] for more details. We omit any further discussion
of this matter here.
6More details on the correct formulation of this axiom will be given in section 2.3.
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Foundation and Replacement come from the contributions of, respectively,
von Neumann and Fraenkel, the others are modern formulations of the orig-
inal axioms of Zermelo. Foundation and Replacement are useful in dealing
with large classes of structures. They are extremely useful to develop the
structural theory of the universe of sets and replacement is necessary to for-
malize properly category theory, or any mathematical field where one deals
with a large family of mathematical objects at the same time (groups, rings,
etc.).
It should be noted that almost all of mathematics can be developed by
means of Zermelo’s axioms. For example the reals, the complex numbers,
the Lp-spaces, and many other objects from number theory, differential and
algebraic geometry, functional analysis, general topology, etc. can be proved
to exist on the basis of the ZFC-axioms. Moreover almost all the relevant
theorems about these structures are logical consequences of these principles.
The picture of the universe of sets offered by Zermelo’s axioms has a con-
ceptual cost: that of introducing collection of sets which are not themselves
sets. Indeed, the collection of all sets V = {x : x = x} is not a set, otherwise
R = {x ∈ V : x /∈ x} would also be one, by the separation axiom applied to
V and the property x /∈ x, leading thus to Russell’s paradox. This concep-
tual cost is exactly the leverage that permits to avoid all known paradoxes,
like Russell’s. We only need to accept that there are collections of sets that
are too big to be considered sets (such as R = {x ∈ V : x /∈ x}); these
collections are normally called proper classes. Some care must be paid in
handling correctly the distinctions between proper classes and sets. We will
come back on this topic in section 2.7.
2. Ordinals, cardinals, and the structure of the universe of
sets
In 1895 Cantor published a first summary of the most important results
of set theory [8]. There he explained the origin of the two main concepts of
his theory: that of ordinal number and that of cardinal number.
When we conceive a collection of mathematical objects, we may abstract
from all of their peculiar properties except for the ordering by which they
present themselves to our mind; the “well-order” by which these objects
are organized gives raise to the concept of ordinal type of a collection; we
can even abstract from the well-order of a collection and retain only its
“quantity”. This second notion gives rise to the concept of cardinal number.
2.1. Natural numbers. Let us first deal with the formalization of the con-
cept of natural number in set theory. Natural numbers are at the same time
the simplest examples of ordinals and cardinals, hence it is “natural” to
start our analysis of Cantor’s notion of cardinality and well-orders briefly
describing how these numbers can be represented by sets.
It is natural to define 0 to be the empty-set, the latter being the unique set
with zero elements. Among the variety of sets containing just one element
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{0} = {∅} = {∅, ∅} can be defined appealing to the pairing axiom, the
extensionality axiom, and the fact that we know what is 0. Let us call this
set 1. Similarly we can define 2 = {0, 1} taking the set whose elements
are 0 and 1, and observing that it has exactly two elements; proceeding so
on so forth, we can define the sets n = {0, . . . , n− 1} consisting of all its
preceding numbers, and observe that it has exactly n-many elements. To
define these sets we just need to appeal to the axiom of extensionality (to
grant their uniqueness), the empty-set axiom (to grant existence of 0), and
to the pairing and union axioms, since for all n:
n = n− 1 ∪ {n− 1} = ∪{n− 1, {n− 1}}.
The current ZFC-formulation of the axiom of infinity states that there
exists a set containing all the n, more precisely it states that:
There exists a set X such that ∅ ∈ X, and if z ∈ X also
z ∪ {z} ∈ X.
The set of natural number N can be defined as the subset of X whose
elements are exactly all the sets n. It is a bit delicate to show by means of
the separation axiom, the power-set axiom, and the axiom of infinity that
N exists. We skip the details.
Similarly one can prove on the basis of the ZFC-axioms that the rationals,
the integers, the reals, the complex numbers etc. are (representable by) sets.
The key point is that the usual textbooks of algebra or calculus build these
objects starting from the natural numbers — which we know to be (repre-
sentable by) a set — and employ at various stages construction principles
which are easily derivable from the ZFC-axioms. We will come back to this
point later on in section 2.6. For the moment we skip the details and assume
that all the above objects are elements of the universe of sets.
2.2. Cardinal numbers. Cardinal numbers represent the cornerstone of
Cantor’s theory of infinity. In modern notation, given two sets X,Y , we
write X ≈ Y whenever there is a bijection f : X → Y . This defines an
equivalence relation on the collection of all sets. It is customary to denote
the cardinality of a set X (i.e. its equivalence class according to ≈) by |X|.
Dealing with the relation ≈ is rather delicate, since it can be proved that
|X| is not a set for any non-empty set X; otherwise we would run into a
paradox. Nonetheless, using the theory of ordinal numbers we will sketch in
2.3, one can select a canonical representative of each equivalence class |X|,
its cardinality, or its cardinal number.
Moreover we have already introduced canonical representatives of finite
sets i.e. the sets n, which we can use to define which are the finite sets: a set
X is finite if it is in bijection with some n; infinite if it is not finite. Other
important classes are also the countable sets, i.e. those in bijection with N,
which define the cardinality class of N, and the uncountable sets, which are
neither finite, nor countable.
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Cantor defines the notions of sum, product, and exponentiation of arbi-
trary cardinalities as follows:
|X|+ |Y | = |X × {0} ∪ Y × {1}|,
|X| · |Y | = |X × Y |,
|X||Y | = |XY | where XY = {f : f is a function from Y to X}.
These rules are well defined and generalize to cardinalities the usual arith-
metical operations on natural numbers. Indeed n×m is in bijection with k,
with k = n ·m, nm —i.e. the set of functions f : m→ n— is in bijection with
l, with l = nm, and m×{0} ∪ n×{1} is in bijection with j, with j = m+ n.
It is natural to define an order relation between cardinalities, saying that
X is not larger than Y (|X| ≤ |Y |), if there is an injective function f : X →
Y . As before this property holds for finite sets, since for example the set
{a0, . . . , an−1} can be injected into {b0, . . . , bm−1} if and only if n ≤ m. An
important property of this order relation, now bearing the name of Cantor-
Schröder-Bernstein Theorem (CSB in what follows), states that |X| = |Y | if
and only if |X| ≤ |Y | ≤ |X|.7
So far there seems to be a complete accordance between the laws of set
theory and those of arithmetics, but unexpected surprises appear when we
consider the case of infinite cardinalities. Indeed, one of the first results
of Cantor shows that |X| + |Y | = |X| · |Y | = max{|X|, |Y |}, whenever at
least one, among X and Y , is infinite. These first results came together
with the discovery of unexpected (and in some cases astonishing) equalities
and differences between cardinalities of familiar infinite sets. To the first
kind belongs the fact that |Q| = |N|, or even that there are as many al-
gebraic numbers (i.e. solutions of polynomials in one variable with integer
coefficients) as natural numbers.
In the case of rational and natural numbers it is clear that |N| ≤ |Q|,
as witnessed by the identity function. On the other hand |Q| ≤ |N| can
be proved as follows: First of all |Q| ≤ |Z × N|, since Q can be identified
with the subset of Z × N given by pairs (n,m), with n,m coprimes and
m > 0. It is also easy to define a bijection of Z×N with N×N; for example
there is a bijection φ between Z and N given by φ : n 7→ −2n if n ≤ 0
and φ : n 7→ 2n + 1 otherwise. Then φ × Id : (n,m) 7→ (φ(n),m) witnesses
|Z× N| = |N× N|
Finally the map (m,n) 7→ 2m+1 · 3n+1 is an injection witnessing that
|N× N| ≤ |N|. Composing all these (in)equalities we obtain:
|Q| ≤ |Z× N| = |N× N| ≤ |N|;
7One direction of this equivalence is trivial since if f : X → Y is a bijection then f, f−1
are both injections. On the other hand if we know that f : X → Y and h : Y → X are
injections, it is not at all clear how to find a bijective g : X → Y . Consider for example




, let h : (0; 1) → [0; 1] be
the inclusion map. These maps witness that |[0; 1]| ≤ |(0; 1)| ≤ |[0; 1]|. On the other hand
any bijection between [0; 1] and (0; 1) cannot be continuous, since the two spaces are not
homeomorphic, while the injections defined above are both continuous. But CSB entails
that a (non-continuous) bijection can be found.
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we conclude that |Q| = |N| by CSB.
With the same line of reasoning, using a smarter codification of all n-
tuples of natural numbers with natural numbers, it is possible to define an
injective map from the algebraic numbers into N. By CSB we conclude that
the two sets are in bijection.
The first true coronation of the theory of cardinal numbers is, however,
the discovery of the existence of infinitely many infinite cardinalities. One
of Cantor’s most celebrated theorem states that |X| < |P(X)| for all sets X.
Its proof is obtained by a smart tweak of Russell’s paradox: suppose, by way
of contradiction, that there is a bijective function f : P(X)→ X and define
Y = {z ∈ X : z 6∈ f−1(z)}. Now, being Y ⊆ X, we can apply f to it and ask
whether f(Y ) ∈ Y . If this were the case, then, by definition of Y , we would
have f(Y ) /∈ f−1(f(Y )) = Y . On the other hand if f(Y ) /∈ Y , by a similar
argument, we can infer f(Y ) ∈ Y , thus showing that f(Y ) ∈ Y if and only if
f(Y ) /∈ Y , a contradiction. The map x 7→ {x} defines an injection of X into
P(X), hence |X| < |P(X)|. Moreover, by iterating the powerset operation,
we get larger and larger infinite cardinalities. It can also be shown that
|P(N)| = |R|. Hence by Cantor’s Theorem |N| < |P(N)| = |R|.
We now would like to give a better picture of how cardinals are organized
by the order relation |X| ≤ |Y |. Indeed, with the information at disposal
so far it is not even clear that the order |X| ≤ |Y | is linear. It is time to
introduce the second key notion of set theory.
2.3. Ordinal numbers. (X,<) is a well-order if < is a linear order on
X such that any non-empty subset of X has a least element according to
<. For example, every finite linear order is a well-order, and the natural
numbers with the usual order (i.e. the structure (N, <)) is a well-order8. But
there are a huge quantity of infinite well-orders which are not isomorphic to
(N, <): A first example is given by (N × N, <lex) where (m,n) <lex (p, q) if
either9 m < p or (m = p and n < q). This well-order is not isomorphic to
(N, <) since (1, 0) is bigger than (0,m), for all m ∈ N.







i = q(x) if either (n < m) or, (n = m and
ai < bi for the least i such that ai 6= bi). Notice that this order has the
monomial xn above all polynomials of degree less than n, and (N×N, <lex)
can be identified inside (N[x], <) as the set of polynomials of degree at most
1, i.e. the predecessors of x2.
A fundamental result on well-orders, due to Zermelo, is the Well-Ordering
Theorem, which is actually an equivalent formulation of AC. It states that
for every non-empty set X there is at least one binary relation < on X such
that (X,<) is a well-order.
8 The natural numbers can be characterized as the unique infinite well-order whose
upward bounded subsets have a maximum. This provides an equivalent formulation of
the induction principle on N.
9≤lex is the usual lexicographic order on N2.
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A second fundamental result on well-orders is due to von Neumann (and
Mostowski). To formulate it we need to introduce the notion of transitive
set : a set X is transitive if for all a ∈ X, a ⊆ X. We say that a set α is a (von
Neumann) ordinal if it is transitive and such that (α,∈) is a linear order. We
invite the reader to check that the sets 0, 1, . . . , 4, . . . are transitive. It can
be proved that every n is a transitive set (and other examples of interesting
transitive sets will come in due course). von Neumann (following a more
general result by Mostowski) proves that for each well-order (X,<) there is
a unique von Neumann ordinal α and a unique order preserving bijection
f : X → α. von Neumann ordinals provide canonical representatives of the
isomorphism types X of a well-order (X,<), i.e. the unique transitive set α
such that (α,∈) belongs to X. For example von Neumann theorem entails
that any finite linear order is isomorphic to (n,∈), for some unique n and
the isomorphism is unique. However the full strength of von Neumann’s
theorem shows up when we have to deal with well orders more complicated
than N. For example we get that there are unique ordinals α, β such that
(N × N, <lex) is isomorphic to (α,∈) and (N[x], <) is isomorphic to (β,∈).
Moreover one can check that α ∈ β holds as well.
A third fundamental result on well orders, due to Cantor, asserts that for
any two well orders (X,<X) (Y,<Y ) there is a trichotomy: either there is a
unique order preserving bijection f : X → Y , i.e. (Y,<Y ) is isomorphic to
(X,<X); or there is some a ∈ Y and a unique order preserving f : X → Y
such that f [X] = {b ∈ Y : b <Y a}, that is (X,<X) is isomorphic to an
initial segment of (Y,<Y ); or conversely (Y,<Y ) is uniquely isomorphic to
an initial segment of (X,<X).
One can use Cantor’s trichotomy theorem, von Neumann’s theorem and
some extra work to show that for any two von Neumann ordinals α, β, either
α ∈ β (when (α,∈) is isomorphic to an initial segment of (β,∈)), or β ∈ α,
or α = β. Therefore one can compare the isomorphism types of two well-
orders simply checking whether the unique ordinals in these isomorphism
types belong to one another or are equal.
For ordinals α, β, we will write α ≤ β to denote that α ∈ β or α = β.
The class Ord, given by von Neumann ordinals, is itsef well ordered by ∈:
if C ⊆ Ord is non-empty, take β ∈ C. If C ∩ β is empty then β = minC;
otherwise C ∩β ⊆ β is non-empty, hence –since (β,∈) is a well-order– it has
an ∈-minimal element α, giving that α = min(C).
2.4. Many infinities, but which? Remark that for ordinals α, β, α ∈ β
entails that α ⊆ β (by transitivity of β), which trivially gives that |α| ≤ |β|.
von Neumann’s theorem applied to the well-orders (N, <), (N × N, <lex),
and (N[x], <) gives us three distinct ordinals: ω 6= α 6= β. By Cantor’s
trichotomy we also have that ω ∈ α ∈ β. On the other hand it is not hard
to check that |ω| = |α| = |β|; it also holds that |ω| > |n| for all n ∈ ω;
actually ω is the least ordinal (according to ∈) in the cardinality class of
countable sets.
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More generally by means of Zermelo’s Well-ordering Theorem one gets
that Ord ∩ |X| is a non-empty subset of Ord for any non-empty cardinality
class |X|. Hence each cardinality class |X| must have an ∈-minimal ordinal,
which we consider the canonical representative of |X|.
We are now in the position to define the subclass Card of Ord, given by
these canonical representatives of all cardinalities10:
Card = {κ : κ is the ∈-least ordinal in |κ|}.
By the trichotomy of ordinals, from λ 6= κ ∈ Card we get that either λ ∈ κ
or κ ∈ λ. Assuming the first, since κ is transitive, we get that λ ⊆ κ, hence
|λ| ≤ |κ|. But since λ 6∈ |κ|, being two different cardinals, we conclude that
|λ| < |κ|. Therefore we have just proved the following.
For κ 6= λ ∈ Card, |λ| < |κ| if and only if λ ∈ κ.
Hence the ∈-relation restricted to Card well-orders its elements according
to their cardinality, moreover the sets n are the canonical representatives
in Card of the cardinality classes of finite sets. It is customary to denote
by ℵα the α-th infinite element of Card according to its well-order given by
∈ and to confuse a cardinality class |X| with the unique ℵα ∈ |X|. With
this notation |ω| = ℵ0, ℵ1 is the least uncountable cardinal, ℵ2 the second
uncountable cardinal, etc.
2.5. Cantor’s continuum problem. We have a very simple table of sum
and multiplication for infinite cardinalities, as well as a nice ordering between
cardinalities (it is a proper class that can be well ordered by a well order
of length Ord). It is now time to address the table of the exponential map
κ 7→ 2κ.
Cantor’s continuum hypothesis CH can be formulated without any refer-
ence to well-orders as follows:
(CH0) There is no set X such that |N| < |X| < |P(N)|.
If we take into account the general theory of cardinalities so far presented,
and recall that 2ℵ0 = |P(N)| = |R|, we can rephrase CH as
(CH1) 2
ℵ0 = ℵ1.
The attempt to verify or falsify CH represents a common trait of a large
portion of the history of set theory, and it is indeed the attempt of finding
a satisfactory solution to the question of how many real numbers there are,
that motivates and explains the two programs we will describe at the end
of this paper.
10For thse familiar with first order logic the definition of Card is slightly problematic:
it uses the collection of proper classes given by cardinalities to define a new proper class,
it is not transparent that with such a definition Card is the extension of a well-defined
property according to the first order formalization of ZFC. With some work (which we
omit) it can be shown that this is indeed the case,
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2.6. The cumulative hierarchy. To proceed further, it is in our eyes
advisable to step back a bit and outline Zermelo’s work on the structure of
the universe of sets.
In order to secure the consistency of ZFC, in 1930 Zermelo [65] was able
to give a precise description of the structure of the universe of sets according
to the ZFC-axioms. The simplest analogy with Zermelo’s work comes from a
comparison of ZFC with the Peano’s axiomatization of natural numbers. N
can be intuitively described as the structure obtained iterating the successor
operator n 7→ n + 1 starting from the element 0 and generating one after
the other the natural numbers, 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, n + 1, . . . . Peano’s axioms
describe N by giving details on the properties of the successor operation and
of its interaction with the operations of sum and multiplication. Moreover
the structure (N,+, ·, 0, 1,=) is the “standard model” of Peano axioms for
arithmetics11.
Zermelo’s work took the same approach with the ambition to give a clear
intuitive picture of the mathematical structure whose elements are all and
only sets: in modern terminology the universe of all sets.
As N can be obtained iterating the successor operator n 7→ n+1, a similar
iterative conception was shown to be essential for the notion of set. Zermelo
showed that the axioms of ZFC grant that the universe of all sets is stratified
in a cumulative hierarchy, where one now uses the power-set operation to
generate the new elements of the hierarchy. In this case we can say that the
ZFC-axioms capture the key properties of the power-set operation describing
its interactions with other simpler set-construction principles.
To describe Zermelo’s stratification of the universe of sets it is useful to
refresh some piece of notation. The symbol ω indicates the well-order of
N, while ω + n is the well-order obtained putting a (the) linear order of
n-elements on top of the natural numbers. Now we can stratify the universe
of sets as follows:
V0 = ∅ = 0,
V1 = P(V0) = {∅} = 1,
V2 = P(V1) = P(P(V0)) = {∅, {∅}} = 2,










11See §3.1 for a brief description of the notion of model of a family of axioms.
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By iterating transfinitely this operation for all ordinals α, one can define Vα
the collection of all sets we can produce in α-many steps12.
In the structure (Vω+1,∈,=) one can already develop number theory,
most of analysis, and great parts of areas of mathematics like differential
geometry; while functional analysis deals mainly with objects belonging to
(or at least subsets of) Vω+2.
Recalling that Ord is the collection of all von Neumann ordinals, the





2.7. On the distinction between sets and proper classes. Some prac-
tical hints to handle correctly sets and proper classes are the following:
• Almost all interesting mathematical entities are (represented by)
sets, and all elements of a set are themselves sets.
• There are interesting collections of sets which are not sets. These
families of sets are named proper classes. The largest is V = {x :
x = x} (where the variable x ranges over all sets), the proper class
consisting of all sets. Other proper classes are: the family of all
groups, the family of all topological spaces, Card, Ord, and many
others.
• Any set X is contained in V , since X = {x ∈ V : x ∈ X} is a
collection of sets. The key distinction between a set and a proper
class is that a set X always belong to a proper class, as X ∈ V ,
while proper classes are exactly those collections of sets which are
“too large” to belong to V , under pain of running into paradoxes.
The term class denotes either a set or a proper class, i.e. a collection
of sets.
• One can handle classes much in the same way one handles sets. For
example the union or intersection
⋃
i∈I Ci of an indexed family of
classes is itself a class (the index set I can be either a set or a proper
class). On the other hand if C is a proper class its powerset P(C)
does not exist: if P(C) were a proper class, its elements would be
sets, but C is an element of P(C), and C is not a set, being a proper
class.
It takes some practice to understand which classes cannot be sets, which
set-theoretic operations (such as unions and intersections) can be safely
performed on a (family of) class(es), yielding perfectly well-defined classes,
and which set-theoretic operations are not valid for classes (as the power-set
operation) for they lead to the construction of paradoxical entities. In any
case nowadays the paradoxes caused by misconceptions on sets and proper
12It can be proved that Vα is transitive for all α, but not linearly orderd by ∈ for n > 2;
we invite the reader to check that this is the case for the first Vns.
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classes are not anymore a source of concerns, as it had been for Cantor and
his contemporaries.
3. The phenomenon of independence
Once a sufficiently clear picture of the universe of sets was available,
the belief in the possibility to find a definitive answer to the most pressing
set theoretical questions became stronger. Put otherwise, after Zermelo’s
definition of V , most mathematicians held the view that it was only a matter
of time (and hard work) to find the solution of questions like CH.
3.1. The independence of CH. For many decades Cantor and many oth-
ers attempted to prove or disprove CH. But it took the genius of both Gödel
and Cohen to show that all these attempts were doomed to fail, at least in
the context of the ZFC-axioms. Indeed, in two subsequent and complemen-
tary steps, Gödel [22] in 1938, and Cohen [9] in 1963, showed that, just
on the basis of the ZFC-axioms, it is impossible, respectively, to prove the
negation of CH, or to prove CH.
We briefly introduce the notion of formal independence, a necessary step
in order to grasp the content of Gödel and Cohen’s result.
Let Γ be a bunch of mathematical assertions, for example the group ax-
ioms. These assertions may, or may not, correctly describe the properties
of a given mathematical structure M. In case the statements in Γ assert
true facts aboutM, we say thatM is a model of Γ, or that Γ is valid in (or
satisfied by) M, and write M |= Γ.
The precise definitions of these concepts would need a lenghty detour in
first order logic; one we will not take for the sake of brevity. Instead, let us
exemplify these notions with an example.
The group axioms are the following statements:
∀x∀y∀z (x∗y)∗z = x∗(y∗z), ∀y (e∗y = y∗e = y), ∀y∃z (x∗y = y∗z = e).
A groupM = (G, ·, 1,=) is a model of the axioms for group theory: when
we interpret ∗ as the multiplication operation · of G, and e as the neutral
element 1 of G, the three formal expressions above are naturally recognized
as assertions stating that the operation · and the element 1 satisfy the laws
making (G, ·, 1,=) a group.
Clearly the group axioms can have non-isomorphic models: for example
(Z,+, 0,=) and (Zn,+, [0]n,=). Letting Γ be the group axioms and ϕ the
formula
∀x(x ∗ · · · ∗ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
= e),
we have that (Z,+, 0,=) is not a model of ϕ, while (Zn,+, [0]n,=) is a model
of ϕ, even though both satisfy the axioms of Γ.
Indeed this is the paradigm of independence. It is enough to show that
there are two models of the same set of axioms Γ, one verifying a sentence
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ϕ, the other verifying its negation, in order to conclude that ϕ is formally
independent from Γ.
In our case we are interested in structures for set theory, i.e. of the form
(M,E,=) with E ⊆M2 a binary relation which is the intended meaning for
M of the ∈-relation, and = the equality relation on M . In this setting it is
correct to state that (V,∈,=) |= ZFC.
The discovery that the same axioms could have different models helped
to develop an abstract perspective, shaping ideas and methods of modern
mathematics. During the XIX century it was first discovered that even in
the case of theories—i.e. collections of mathematical propositions—meant
to describe a unique reality, like geometry, there might be different incom-
patible models. Concretely, this occurred with the discovery of models for
geometry not satisfying Euclid’s Parallel Axiom. This axiom is indeed inde-
pendent from the other axioms of geometry, since it holds in the standard
three, or two, dimensional euclidean space, but fails on the hyperbolic space
or on the sphere.
This is exactly what Gödel’s and Cohen’s results achieve with respect to
CH and ZFC. They provide two structures that satisfy all ZFC-axioms one
verifying CH, the other falsifying it.
3.2. Gödel’s constructible universe. The key idea of Gödel’s construc-
tion consists in carving inside the universe V the minimal model of ZFC
containing all ordinals Ord, and closed under the most basic set-theoretical
operations, which Gödel reduced to the following list:
G1(X,Y ) = {X,Y } G2(X,Y ) = X × Y
G3(X,Y ) = {(x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, x ∈ y} G4(X,Y ) = X \ Y
G5(X,Y ) = X ∩ Y G6(X) =
⋃
X = {z : ∃y ∈ X z ∈ y}
G7(X) = {x : (x, y) ∈ X} G8(X) = {(x, y) : (y, x) ∈ X}
G9(X) = {(x, y, z) : (x, z, y) ∈ X} G10(X) = {(x, y, z) : (y, z, x) ∈ X}
The resulting structure was named the constructible hierarchy L by Gödel
himself, given its extremely simple definition of a contructivist flavour.
Moreover, Gödel showed that L satisfies ZFC and CH at the same time.
Further investigations starting with the seminal work of Jensen [29] showed
that L has such a simple structure that it is most often possible to compute,
according to L, the solution (in L) of many problems undecidable (or open)
on the basis of ZFC alone. We will detail more on this point later on.
It is possible to show that L is the smallest transitive model of ZFC
containing all ordinals, being the intersection of all transitive classes M
contained in V , such that (M,∈,=) |= ZFC and M contain all ordinals.
Roughly stated, L throws away many sets of V and retains just the minimal
amount of sets needed to validate ZFC.
3.3. Forcing. The strategy adopted by Cohen to construct a model of ZFC
where CH fails consisted in devising a completely new technique, named
forcing.
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While Gödel’s constructible universe carves inside V the minimal model
of ZFC, Cohen’s forcing method takes an opposite approach and aims to
enlarge V , adding sets that are “new” in a sense to be specified later, and
thus producing a larger universe of sets. What is true or false in such a
larger universe of sets depends on which “new” sets are added.
We cannot refrain from giving a brief description of some of the aspects
of forcing. We have to admit that this is far from easy for both conceptual
and technical reasons. There are several obstructions, one being that most
mathematicians may complete their graduate studies without ever encoun-
tering a course in logic during their master or bachelor program. Hence we
will try to give the flavour of Cohen’s forcing method outlining analogies
between forcing and other more familiar constructions.
The simplest analogy compares forcing with the adjunction of a polyno-
mial root to a field. Moving from the structure (Q, ·,+,=) to the structure
(Q(
√
2), ·,+,=) (which are both models of the field axioms), we find in the
larger field both solutions of the equation x2 − 2 = 0, which has no roots
in Q. The positive solution belongs to the set Q ∪ {
√
2}, but the latter set
is not a field. Hence it is natural to enlarge it to Q(
√
2), adding the least
possible family of elements X such that Q ∪X is a field containing
√
2.
Much in the same way, Cohen’s idea is to start from a transitive class
(or set) M , such that (M,∈,=) |= ZFC, and add a new set G to M satis-
fying certain desirable properties, so to build the smallest transitive model
(M [G],∈,=) of ZFC properly containing M ∪ {G}.
But which models of set theory can we enlarge? Of course we cannot
hope to enlarge V , the collection of all sets, because any G will be, itself,
a set and therefore in V , hence we would have V ⊆ V [G] ⊆ V , ending up
with what we started.
A way out to this logical difficulty is to perform a boolean valued con-
struction13: one defines a new proper class V B/G and a new binary relation
∈B /G on V B/G which is also a proper class different from the binary relation
∈, thus showing the non-standard character of the model (V B/G,∈B /G,=).
These14 two (proper) classes of sets are given by a well-defined property, and
(V B/G,∈B /G,=) is a structure where to test the truth of ZFC exactly the
same way as (V,∈,=) is. It turns out that (V B/G,∈B /G,=) is a model of
the ZFC-axioms.
We can also define a map k : V → V B/G (of course, different from the
identity) which embeds V as a substructure of V B/G, i.e. is such that a ∈ b
if and only if k(a) ∈B /G k(b). In this way we can view V B/G as an extension
of (the image under k of) V .
13We roughly present this method following the alternative approach to forcing (with
respect to Cohen’s treatment) devised originally by Vopenka, Scott, and Solovay [3].
14For the averted reader already familiar with forcing, we are here describing a scenario
in which G is an ordinary ultrafilter on B, not a V -generic one, see [3] or the notes [26, 59]
for more details on this approach.
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Let us briefly sketch some considerations which guide the boolean valued
construction15. We will borrow ideas from functional analysis and present a
toy example of the forcing method which outlines that certain well known
spaces of functions can also be seen as extensions of the real numbers on
them obtained by means of forcing16. In particular our aim is to endow a
certain ring of germs of measurable functions with a topological–algebraic–
order–etc. structure resembling the natural one we have on the real numbers.
Suppose we want to describe a new real number. This real number should
be generic, i.e. share any property which almost all real numbers have. For
example it should be non-algebraic, since so are almost all real numbers,
and it should be different from any fixed real number a, given that so are
all other real numbers except a. Clearly such a new, generic real number
cannot exist. Indeed, if it were some b ∈ R, in order to be generic it should
be different from itself, which is impossible.
To overcome this logical difficulty, the forcing method resorts to two clever
ideas. First we might change the truth values we use, from {True,False},
the trivial boolean algebra, to a larger set, whose elements form a more
complicated boolean algebra17.
In the example below we use the complete boolean algebra MALG given
by equivalence classes of Lebesgue measurable sets A ⊆ R modulo null
sets18. Denoting by [A] the equivalence class modulo null sets of the set
A, the family of equivalence classes is a boolean algebra with operations
[A] ∧ [B] = [A ∩ B], ¬[A] = [R \ A], [A] ∨ [B] = [A ∪ B]. It is a theorem
(not always well known) that this boolean algebra is complete (i.e. admits
suprema for all its subsets) with
∨
i∈I [Ai] = [
⋃
i∈I Ai].
To each sentence φ we can attach a boolean value JφK ∈ MALG represent-
ing its truth-value. [R] is the truth, [∅] is the falsity, for any set A with A
and R \ A both of positive Lebesgue measure [A] denotes an intermediate
truth value neither completely true nor completely false. The attribution of
boolean values to properties φ should respect the logical structure of φ; for
example a true sentence gets value [R], a false one gets value [∅], Jφ ∨ ψK
gets boolean value JφK∨ JψK (φ∨ψ denotes the disjunction of φ with ψ), ¬φ
(the negation of φ) gets boolean value ¬JφK, etc.19
15We warn again the reader that the remainder of this section is far more advanced
then the subsequent parts of the paper and that she/he can safely skip this part without
compromising the comprehension of the following sections. For the remainder of this
section we assume the reader is familiar with the basic properties of Lebesgue measure on
Rn and of the space L∞(R) given by essentially bounded measurable functions.
16A detailed account on what is sketched below can be found in [55].
17We refer the reader to [21] for the basic theory of boolean algebras.
18MALG stands for Measure ALGebra.
19For those familiar with first order logic J∃xφK =
∨
aJφ(a)K as a ranges in the appro-
priate domain. To interpret quantifiers we use that MALG is complete.
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In particular MALG gives us the means to properly interpret logical prop-
erties without committing ourselves to assert that a certain property is ei-
ther true or false: there will be cases (see below) in which a certain logical
property φ will get an intermediate value JφK neither true nor false.
The second clever idea of forcing regards the procedure to define the
new elements. Consider the space of real-valued measurable functions. The
elements of this space will be used to name the new real numbers according
to a certain forcing construction. Indeed, we can identify R inside this space
by means of the constant functions ca : x 7→ a for each a ∈ R.
Take now sin(x) and cos(x). We want to be able to decide whether these
functions denote new, generic real numbers different from any a ∈ R. If
so, we want also to be able to decide which of the two denotes the bigger
“new” real number. Forcing attaches to each Lebesgue measurable property
P (x1, . . . , xn) on Rn and to measurable functions f1, . . . , fn the equivalence
class in MALG of the set {x ∈ R : P (f1(x), . . . , fn(x))} 20. For example we
assign to the formula sin(x) = cos(x) its boolean value Jsin(x) = cos(x)K =
[{x ∈ R : sin(x) = cos(x)}] in MALG; since this is the equivalence class
of a measure 0-set, generically sin(x) and cos(x) will name different reals.
Similarly for each a ∈ R
{x ∈ R : sin(x) = ca(x) = a}
is countable, hence of measure 0. This means that sin(x) denotes a real
number different from any a ∈ R. Hence, a “new” real. On the other hand
sin(x) < cos(x) gets boolean value
[{x ∈ R : sin(x) < cos(x)}] = [
⋃
n∈Z
((2n− 1) · π + π
4
; 2n · π + π
4
)]
and sin(x) > cos(x) gets boolean value [
⋃
n∈Z(2n · π +
π




Jsin(x) 6= cos(x)K = [R\(π ·Z+π/4)] = Jsin(x) < cos(x)K∨Jsin(x) > cos(x)K,
and therefore it is true that sin(x) and cos(x) denote two different reals and
that they are comparable, since to these sentences we assign the equivalence
class of R in MALG.
On the other hand in order to decide whether sin(x) > cos(x) holds or not,
we must decide whether to choose Jsin(x) < cos(x)K or Jsin(x) > cos(x)K,
in particular the logical properties sin(x) < cos(x) and sin(x) > cos(x) gets
both positive (but complementary) boolean values in MALG. Similarly we
will have to decide whether the map arctan(x) is smaller or larger than sin(x)
and/or cos(x), and such decisions must be made for all measurable functions.
Also, the decisions must be coherent, in the sense that it cannot be the case
that we can choose simultaneously the boolean values Jsin(x) < cos(x)K,
Jcos(x) < arctan(x)K, Jarctan(x) < sin(x)K, otherwise we would not end up
having a linear order on these functions (which is a property we should have,
20Notice that if P ⊆ Rn is Lebesgue measurable, so is {x ∈ R : P (f1(x), . . . , fn(x))}.
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if our family of new and old real numbers describes a new structure which
satisfies most of the properties the continuum has).
A coherent selection of choices is possible resorting to the notion of ultra-
filter G on MALG: a subset of MALG closed under ∧ i.e. [A], [B] ∈ G entails
that [A∩B] ∈ G, and such that exactly one among [A] or [R\A] ∈ G for any
[A] ∈ MALG; these conditions entail that [R] ∈ G and [∅] /∈ G, and also that
whenever [A] ∈ G and B ⊇ A, [B] ∈ G as well. Roughly an ultrafilter G on
MALG decides which among the [A] belonging to the boolean algebra MALG
are considered “true” (those in G), and the selection is coherent: i.e., if [A]
and [B] are “true” so is [A] ∧ [B]; maximal: i.e., it always decide whether
[A] or ¬[A] is “true”; and consistent with what MALG has already decided
about truth: i.e., [R] ∈ G and [∅] /∈ G, and if [A] ∈ G and [B] is “more true”
than [A] according to MALG, i.e. B ⊇ A, then [B] ∈ G as well 21 .
Now given G ultrafilter on MALG and a measurable function f , define
[f ]G = {g : Jf = gK ∈ G}. Since just one among Jsin(x) < cos(x)K ∈
G or Jsin(x) ≥ cos(x)K ∈ G, G selects which of the two holds; on the
other hand since Jsin(x) = cos(x)K = [∅], either Jsin(x) < cos(x)K ∈ G or
Jsin(x) > cos(x)K ∈ G. More generally we obtain that the relation <G given
by [f ]G <G [g]G if and only if Jf < gK ∈ G defines a dense linear order with
no end-points on {[f ]G : f is real-valued measurable}.
Let us sketch a proof of the density property of <G: Assume [f ]G <G [g]G,
we must find some [h]G such that [f ]G <G [h]G <G [g]G. Now [f ]G <G [g]G
if and only if Jf < gK = [{x ∈ R : f(x) < g(x)}] ∈ G. Let h(x) = f(x)+g(x)2 .
Then
Jf < hK ∧ Jh < gK = Jf < h < gK = [{x ∈ R : f(x) < h(x) < g(x)}]
Since
{x ∈ R : f(x) < h(x) < g(x)} = {x ∈ R : f(x) < g(x)},
and [{x ∈ R : f(x) < g(x)}] ∈ G, we get that Jf < hK, Jh < gK are both in
G, yielding that [f ]G <G [h]G <G [g]G.
We have just outlined a very special case of a deeper result. Consider the
space L∞+(R) given by measurable functions f : R→ R ∪ {+∞,−∞} such
that {a ∈ R : f(a) = ±∞} has Lebesgue measure 0 22. Given a ultrafilter G
21For the specific case we are considering we can give an alternative description of the
notion of ultrafilter. Consider the real C∗-algebra L∞(R) given by real-valued measurable
functions which are also essentially bounded. A character θ : L∞(R)→ R, is a continuous
homomorphism of this real C∗-algebra onto R. Denote by χA the characteristic function
of a measurable set A, and given a character θ let Gθ = {[A] : θ(χA) = 1}. Then Gθ
is an ultrafilter on MALG. Conversely given a ultrafilter G on MALG define a character
θG : L




[Ai]∈G λi whenever {Ai : i ∈ I} is a
partition of R in Lebesgue measurable sets; we can use the density of linear combinations
of characteristic functions of measurable sets in L∞(R) to extend θG to all of L∞(R). In
particular the two notions of character and ultrafilter are completely equivalent for MALG.
22For example the identity, x 7→ 1/x, the exponential map are examples of measurable
functions in L∞+(R)\L∞(R), i.e. measurable functions which are not essentially bounded.
Strictly speaking x 7→ 1/x is not even real-valued measurable since it is not defined on
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on MALG, define the ring of germs L∞+(R)/G letting [f ]G = [g]G if and only
if Af,g = [{x : f(x) = g(x)}] is in the ultrafilter G on MALG. It is actually
possible to check that L∞+(R)/G with its pointwise operations modulo G
(i.e. [f ]G ·G [g]G = [f · g]G, etc.) is a field 23.
The forcing theorem, which is the key to understand what is true in
L∞+(R)/G, can be phrased as follows in this specific context:
Given a Borel24 relation R ⊆ Rn, a ultrafilter G on MALG, f1 . . . , fn ∈ L∞+(R),
we say that
R̄/G([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G) holds if and only if [{a ∈ R : R(f1(a), . . . , fn(a))}] ∈ G.
Then for R,S Borel relations on Rn, their lifts R̄/G, S̄/G behave properly, for
example:
• Rn \R/G([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G) holds if and only if R̄/G([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G) does
not,
• R ∩ S/G([f1], . . . , [fn]) if and only if
R̄/G([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G) and S̄/G([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G),
• the same conclusion holds for the (possibly non Lebesgue measurable) re-
lation on Rn−1 obtained by projecting along an axis a Borel relation on
Rn, and for the Borel relation on Rn given by the countable union (or
intersection) of Borel relations Rj ⊆ Rn for j ∈ N.
More generally given an n-ary Borel relation R ⊆ Rn and a first order formula
φ(x1, . . . , xn) in a language with one n-ary relation symbol
(L∞+(R)/G, R̄/G,=) |= φ([f1]G, . . . , [fn]G)
if and only if
[{a ∈ R : (R, R,=) |= φ(f1(a), . . . , fn(a))}] ∈ G.
This theorem is extremely powerful, for it links the logical properties
which hold in L∞+(R)/G to the combinatorial properties of the boolean
algebra MALG and of the ultrafilter G.
We are just scratching the surface of the enormous complications one has
to overcome to deal properly with forcing. The general method of forcing
applied to the structure (V,∈,=) is able to encode the above situation as
follows: the reals are the real numbers of V , and one is able, by means of
forcing, to construct a structure V MALG/G such that the real numbers of
V MALG/G are exactly the elements of the ring L
∞+(R)/G. In particular in
all of R but just on a conull subset of R, this is one of the reason to extend the possible
values of the functions to R ∪ {+∞,−∞}, while restricting the new set of values to have
measure 0.
23Here we are really using that the space we work with is L∞+(R), for example for




to L∞+(R)\L∞(R), while the measurable function f : R→ R∪{+∞,−∞} with constant
value +∞ is such that [f ]G does not have an inverse.
24See the beginning of section 5.2 for the definition of Borel set. Remark that Borel
sets are Lebesgue measurable.
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V MALG/G there are new real numbers, for example [sin(x)]G, with respect
to those existing in V .
However to define properly V MALG/G we should: (a) besides describing
how to define the new real numbers in the larger model V MALG/G, define
what counts as a natural number, a complex number, etc. in V MALG/G.
More generally one must be able to define all set-theoretical operations in
V MALG/G, since it must be shown that (V
MALG/G,∈MALG /G,=) models
ZFC; (b) be able to define the forcing theorem in general for models of the
form V B/G where B is a complete boolean algebra and G is a ultrafilter
on it; (c) finally, in order to use forcing to establish the independence of a
statement ϕ (such as the continuum hypothesis), we should find some B so
that we can compute whether V B/G models ϕ or not.
The very ingenious strategy of Cohen was to use the forcing theorem to
transfer the problem of checking whether CH holds or not in V B/G to the
problem of checking whether B satisfies certain combinatorial properties. He
was then able to prove that the algebra C given by the regular open sets of
the space [0, 1]P(P(N)) endowed with the product of the euclidean topology
on [0, 1] is such that V C/G models
25 ¬CH.
4. Gödel’s program
The set theoretical tools developed by Gödel and Cohen show that the
phenomenon of independence in mathematics is broader than expected and
not confined to ad hoc examples, as those discovered by Gödel, in 1931, by
means of his incompleteness theorem. Indeed CH is a mathematical problem
which grew out of the researches of the most prominent mathematicians of
the end of the XIX century. The combined use of Gödel’s constructible
hierarchy and Cohen’s forcing method showed the independence of a variety
of mathematical problems arising in distinct fields, such as group theory,
e.g. the Whitehead problem on the characterization of free groups [49],
[50], functional analysis, e.g. Kaplansky characterization of Banach algebra
morphisms [11], or the problem of the existence of outer automorphisms for
the Calkin algebra [12, 47], and many, many others. These results showed
the inadequacy of ZFC to give a complete and satisfactory picture of a fast
growing discipline like contemporary mathematics. There are “outskirts”
of the mathematical universe where the ordinary methods of proof do not
suffice to find an answer to well-posed and natural problems, at least this
is not possible with the means offered by ZFC. Nonetheless set theoretic
techniques are crucial to understand which problems inhabit this hazy part
of mathematics.
25For a complete presentation of this method see [3, 34] or the notes [59]. Remark
that (modulo the identification of Cohen’s original poset — given by partial functions
p : ω2 × ω → 2 with finite domain — with its boolean completion, and the assumption of
Cohen that ℵ2 = |P(P(N))| holds in the ground model) the above example is exactly the
original forcing notion devised by Cohen.
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4.1. How to overcome the weakness of ZFC? Some scholars, like Cohen
himself [10], or Feferman, argue that the independence results with respect
to ZFC cast shadows on the possibility that a mathematical theory of in-
finity could be captured axiomatically. But independence with respect to
ZFC, by itself, does not prove the existence of intrinsic limits of the ax-
iomatic method, but only of a specific axiomatic system: namely ZFC. An
approach offered by the set-theoretic community, and suggested by Gödel
himself, consists in supplementing the ZFC-axioms with new set theoretical
principles, able to give solutions to the largest possible family of otherwise
independent, or open, problems. This approach goes under the name of
Gödel’s program.
The practice of extending the means of proofs with new principles assert-
ing the existence of certain mathematical entities is as old as mathematics
itself, even if it often took time to incorporate these principles in the main
body of mathematics. Think about the introduction of irrational numbers
following the Pithagorean discovery of the irrationality of
√
2, or the use
of complex numbers to find roots of third degree polynomial equations. As
a more recent example, Groethendieck universes26, mathematical objects
whose existence cannot be proved in ZFC, were used in Wiles original solu-
tion to Fermat’s last theorem. However, there is a difference between the
use of new mathematical principles in Wiles proof and the extensions of
ZFC originated by Gödel’s program: their unequal status of necessity. As a
matter of fact a solution of Fermat’s last theorem which avoids any reference
to Groethendieck universes and that uses elementary methods—i.e. formal-
izable in Peano’s Arithmetic or at least in ZFC—is believed by many to be
possible, although unknown, at least for the case of Peano’s Arithmetic. On
the other hand it is provably impossible to solve CH on the basis of ZFC. To
give a solution to CH it is necessary to supplement ZFC with new axioms.
As already mentioned, there are scholars, like Feferman [13], who doubt
the existence of, yet unknown, set-theoretic truths, able to decide CH. But
in our opinion the situation is not much different than it was in other well-
known turning points in the development of mathematics. One example
is the debate surrounding the introduction of AC at the beginning of the
XX century [43]. While AC brings some undesirable consequences, such as
the existence of non-measurable sets of reals, it has been finally accepted
by most mathematicians. A compelling reason being that by means of AC
it is possible to give a simple general outline of many mathematical the-
ories: one example is the nice general theory of cardinalities we sketched
in 2.2; other fundamental consequences of AC are the Hahn-Banach theo-
rem, the existence of prime ideals in rings, the compactness of the product
26Groethendieck universes are mathematical entities providing a correct framework
where certain category theoretic questions can be properly formulated and solved. Their
existence is not provable in ZFC but follows from the axiom stating the existence of
a strongly inaccessible cardinal; see [51] for an account on Groethendieck universes, in
section 5.1 we give the definition of strongly inaccessible cardinals.
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of compact spaces, just to name few of them. Nowadays most textbooks
in functional analysis, algebra, topology, etc. do not question the truth of
AC and develop their field using it freely. Following Hilbert’s motto “Wir
müssen wissen – wir werden wissen”27, we consider a feasible mathematical
task to find the correct axioms for set theory which can settle CH, and two
promising candidates are outlined in the final section of this paper. We are
also confident that time and practice can bring the mathematical commu-
nity to accept these axioms much in the same way it occurs now for AC.
Of course the adoption of new axioms will require both mathematical and
philosophical arguments, since not only these axioms should be able to solve
old problems—a good mathematical point in favor of their acceptance— but
they also need to be well justified—by philosophical arguments.
4.2. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic. There is a vast literature on the criteria for
justification of new axioms in set theory28. To give a rough idea of the
discussion, we recall two famous quotes by Gödel [23], where he introduced
the two kinds of justification that still occupy a central role in this debate:
intrinsic and extrinsic justifications29. Let us start with the intrinsic ones.
For first of all the axioms of set theory by no means form a
system closed in itself, but, quite on the contrary, the very
concept of set on which they are based suggests their exten-
sion by new axioms which assert the existence of still further
iterations of the operation “set of”. [...] probably there ex-
ist others based on hitherto unknown principles; also there
may exist, besides the ordinary axioms, the axioms of infinity
and the axioms mentioned in footnote 17 [here Gödel means
large cardinal axioms] other (hitherto unknown) axioms of
set theory which a more profound understanding of the con-
cepts underlying logic and mathematics would enable us to
recognize as implied by these concepts [23, pp. 260].
On the other hand, extrinsic justifications assimilate set-theoretical method-
ology to that of empirical sciences.
Furthermore, however, even disregarding the intrinsic neces-
sity of some new axiom, and even in case it had no intrinsic
necessity at all, a decision about its truth is possible also
in another way, namely, inductively by studying its “suc-
cess”, that is, its fruitfulness in consequences and in partic-
ular in “verifiable” consequences, i.e., consequences demon-
strable without the new axiom, whose proofs by means of
27We must know – we will know.
28Besides the classical contribution by Gödel, discussed in this section, we advise the
interested reader to consult the work of Boolos [5], Maddy [37, 38], Koellner [32], and a
more comprehensive discussion in [14].
29However, there are also new perspectives on justification in set theory that try to
overcome this classical dicothomy [2].
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the new axiom, however, are considerably simpler and easier
to discover, and make it possible to condense into one proof
many different proofs [23, pp. 261].
Although these two forms of justification seem to offer very different cri-
teria, it is a well balanced mixture of both that is commonly used to give
reasons for the acceptance of new axioms.
5. Large cardinals, determinacy axioms, and generic
absoluteness for second order arithmetic
5.1. Large cardinals. The simplest and first natural examples of new ax-
ioms extending ZFC are large cardinal axioms. These axioms formalize the
idea that the process of generation of new levels of the cumulative hierarchy
of V is never completed.
The first example of a large cardinal axiom is the axiom of infinity: it
can be shown that (Vω,∈,=) is a model of all other ZFC-axioms; but in
Vω there are no infinite sets. This shows that it is not enough to appeal
to the construction and existence principles given by the other axioms of
ZFC to assert the existence of an infinite set, since there is a model of
all these axioms in which no infinite set exists, but that we really need
to postulate the existence of infinite sets. Remark also that, viewed as a
suborder, any cofinal subset of N has the same isomorphism type of the
natural numbers, i.e. (ω,∈). Generalizing these two observations one can
produce the simplest example of a proper large cardinal axiom: δ is strongly
inaccessible if (Vδ,∈,=) |= ZFC and any cofinal subset of δ has order type
δ. By Gödel’s incompleteness theorem ZFC cannot prove the existence of
strongly inaccessible cardinals, otherwise it would prove its own consistency.
In particular a strongly inaccessible cardinal is an ordinal whose description
cannot be obtained starting from some smaller ordinal and appealing just
to the construction principles given by the ZFC-axioms.
Many other large cardinal axioms have been formulated in the past cen-
tury and are still introduced nowadays. As Gödel anticipated in his writings
[23], there are very good reasons to argue in favor of their intrinsic plau-
sibility; for an overview of these arguments see also [33]. Nonetheless in
this paper we decide not to pursue any further this type of arguments. The
reason being that soft and/or detailed accounts on this topic are already
available30. Moreover an exposition of the basic properties of the most im-
portant large cardinal axioms, and of the intrinsic reasons to accept them
would require us to sketch far more set theory than what has been briefly
outlined in §1 and §231. We will instead focus on the extrinsic reasons to
30For a soft introduction to large cardinals see for example the nice introductory paper
by Koellner available at logic.harvard.edu. The standard reference for large cardinals and
their properties is Kanamori’s [30].
31A warning to the reader is in order at this point: we will not define in this paper
any other large cardinal notion. Nonetheless at several points of the discussion to follow
we will mention a variety of large cardinals, including (in order of increasing strength):
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accept large cardinal axioms, outlining in the other parts of this section the
striking consequences on the properties of real numbers one can draw from
them. This is a topic far less explored in the literature, for which an intro-
ductory account as the one we sketch below is in our opininon –at least to
some extent– still missing32.
5.2. Regularity properties for sets of reals and determinacy.
Given a topological space33 (Y, τ) and X ⊆ Y :
• X is Borel if it belongs to the smallest σ-algebra containing the open
sets (a σ-algebra on P(Y ) is a family of subsets of Y closed under
countable intersections, countable unions, and complements).
• X is Lebesgue measurable (now noted as LM(X)) if it belongs to the
σ-algebra generated by the Lebesgue measure on R.
• X has the property of Baire (BP(X)), if there is an open set U
such that U∆X (the symmetric difference) is a meager set (i.e. the
countable union of nowhere dense sets).
• X has the property of the perfect set (PSP(X)), if it is either count-
able or has a nonempty perfect subset (which is a closed set with
no isolated points). Cantor proved that any subset of R with the
perfect set property is either countable or in bijection with R, hence
cannot be a counterexample to34 CH.
Already at the beginning of the XX century it was known, using AC, how
to build sets without the Baire property (Bernstein), or without the per-
fect set property (Bernstein, again), or non-Lebesgue measurable (Vitali).
On the other hand the combined works of Cantor, Bendixson, Alexandrov,
Lebesgue, Borel, and others showed that all Borel sets have all the above
strongly inaccessible cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals,
supercompact cardinals, etc. We refer the reader to Koellner’s paper or to Kanamori’s
book for details on the definitions and the properties of these cardinals. Let us just
mention that a crucial and surprising feature of these axioms is that they line up in a
well-ordered linear hierarchy, for example: supercompacts are Woodin; if δ is Woodin,
it is strongly inaccessible and (Vδ,∈,=) models that there are strong cardinals; a strong
cardinal is measurable; a measurable cardinal is strongly inaccessible. A chart describing
the known dependencies between the most important large cardinal axioms can be found
in the last pages of Kanamori’s book.
In the remainder of this paper we will outline certain consequences these large cardinals
have on the universe of sets. These consequences are either mathematical facts which
refer to familiar mathematical concepts, or mathematical facts which can be meaningfully
formulated on the basis of the set theory sketched so far. In particular there is no need
to define any of the above large cardinal axioms in order to outline the consequences we
will draw from them, and we will not do that here.
32See however the beautiful papers by Koellner [32] or by Woodin [63].
33To grasp the basic ideas guiding the definitions to follow the reader may assume that
Y is the set of real numbers with the usual topology.
34The attempt to verify CH by showing the perfect set property for subsets of the reals
of increasing topological complexity gave rise to a very interesting line of research, which
is now part of descriptive set theory (see [31]).
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regularity properties. In 1970 Solovay [52] proved that if there is a strongly
inaccessible cardinal—one of the lowest in the hierarchy of large cardinals—
it is consistent that all subsets of the reals are Lebesgue measurable, have
the property of Baire, and have the perfect set property. Stated more pre-
cisely: it is possible to construct a model of set theory in which choice fails
(i.e. a model of the axiom system ZFC \ {AC}) and all the above properties
hold; moreover Solovay’s model satisfies also a weak form of the Axiom of
Choice, the Axiom of Dependent Choices35 DC.
The study of regularity properties of subsets of R is greatly simplified
by the observation that for Borel (or topologically more complex) sets it
does not matter whether we consider them as subsets of R or of any other
Polish space36, such as the Cantor space 2N or the Baire space NN. The
reason being that all these spaces are Borel isomorphic, that is in bijection
via a Borel map with a Borel inverse37. For this reason, without loss of
generality, we can restrict our discussion to the space 2N endowed with the
product topology.
The game GA with players I and II and payoff the set A ⊆ 2N is defined
according to the following rules: it lasts ω-moves; the two players alternate
their moves with I playing a2n at even stages 2n, II playing a2n+1 at odd
stages 2n+ 1; after ω-moves I wins if 〈an : n ∈ N〉 ∈ A, II wins otherwise.
A strategy for player I is a map σ : 2<N → 2 which for any given partial
play 〈a0, . . . , a2n+1〉 tells player I what is the move to make in this case, i.e.
σ(〈a0, . . . , a2n+1〉). Hence a run of the game according to σ looks like
〈a0 = σ(∅), a1, a2 = σ(〈a0, a1〉), a3, a4 = σ(〈a0, a1, a2, a3〉), a5, . . . 〉
We say that σ is a winning strategy for I if any run of the game according
to σ is won by I no matter what II plays38 . Similarly one defines a winning
strategy for player II. It is not hard to check that games of finite length
with perfect information, like Chess or Noughts and Crosses, can be coded
by games of type39 GA, by deciding which of the two players wins in case of
35DC states that for all non-empty set X and every σ : X<N → X, there exists
f : N → X such that f(n) = σ(f  n) for all n ∈ N. It allows to construct infinite
sequences in X obeying the constraints imposed by σ.
36A topological space (X, τ) is Polish if it is separable (i.e. it has a countable dense
subset) and there is a distance d on X with the property that (X, d) is a complete metric
space such that the balls B(x, ε) = {y ∈ X : d(x, y) < ε} generated by d are a basis for
the topology τ .
37f : X → Y is Borel if the preimage of Borel sets is Borel.
38It is not transparent that non-trivial runs of the games according to a strategy σ
always exist. This can be proved appealing to the Axiom of Dependent Choices.
39In the definition of infinite games of length ω it is convenient to assume that a draw
is not possible to simplify many arguments. This is not restrictive: optimal strategies
for games in which the players can also get to a draw can be recovered by combining the
winning strategies of the two games obtained by letting either of the two players win in
case of a draw.
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a draw. A result by Zermelo gives that all such finite games are determined,
that is exactly one of the two players has a winning strategy40.
In 1962 Mycielski and Steinhaus [46] introduced the Axiom of Determi-
nacy AD, stating that AD(A) holds for all A ⊆ 2N, where AD(A) says that
exactly one of the two players has a winning strategy, i.e. GA is determined.
AD was proposed as an alternative to AC, being provably false assuming
ZFC, and it fits with a fruitful line of research on games that was started
during the 20s and the 30s by Mazur, Banach, and Ulam among others41. It
is a result, already from the 50s, by Gale and Stewart [20], that games with
a closed or open payoff set are determined. A major surprise came in the
early seventies when Martin [39] proved that the existence of a measurable
cardinal entails that all games with analytic42 payoff set are determined.
Moreover, Martin later showed [40], in ZFC, that games with a Borel payoff
set are determined, this time avoiding any use of large cardinals. These
subsequent results are normally considered as extrinsic reasons for the claim
that large cardinals are well-justified principles extending ZFC. As we hinted
before, we see here at play a model of justification that resembles one of
prediction and confirmation from natural sciences.
The use of consequences of AD greatly simplifies the study of regularity
properties. Indeed a huge variety of regularity properties, including the
perfect set property, the Baire property, and Lebesgue measurability, follow
from the determinacy of an appropriate game in combination with43 DC.
A key definition, isolated by Feng, Magidor, and Woodin in [15] is that
of universally Baire sets of reals:
Given a topological space X, A ⊆ 2N is X-Baire if f−1[A]
has the Baire property in X for all f : X → 2N continuous.
Moreover we say that A is universally Baire if it is X-Baire
for all compact Hausdorff topological spaces X.
Not only Borel subsets of 2N are universally Baire (this is provable in
ZFC), but assuming the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals44
so are all sets definable in second order arithmetic, i.e. those subsets of 2N
40Zermelo’s proof is non constructive, for example in the case of chess we do not (as
yet) know which of the two players has a winning strategy; once again assuming that a
draw is a winning condition for one of the two players.
41See [36] for an overview of this history and [31] for some of the uses of such games
in the study of topological properties of spaces of functions.
42A ⊆ 2N is analytic if it is the continuous image of some Borel set. Clearly Borel sets
are analytic, as witnessed by the identity function.
43One needs DC to grant that for certain sets B (depending on the regularity property
one wants to establish for A) there always are infinite runs of the games GB according to
the winning strategy given by AD(B).
44 The expression “a proper class of large cardinals with a given property φ” asserts
that the family of large cardinals satisfying φ is a proper class. It is out of the scope of
the present paper to define Woodin cardinals (the interested is referred to [53]), let us
just remark that (at least in our opinion) if one is eager to accept the intrinsic reasons
which justify the existence of inaccessible cardinals, then she/he should have no problems
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definable with parameters in the first order structure 〈N,P(N),∈, 0,+,=〉
or, equivalently, in the first order structure (Vω+1,∈,=)45.
A major result of Martin and Steel [41], combined with the work of
Woodin [35], establishes that if one assumes a proper class of Woodin car-
dinals then all universally Baire sets of reals are determined, i.e. GA is
determined if A is universally Baire. Therefore all nice regularity properties
hold for universally Baire sets assuming large cardinals.
Summing up our discussion: AC has undesirable consequences, as subsets
of R failing to have certain regularity properties, but it also gives the means
to prove in full generality certain expected results which are essential for
several fields of mathematics. Large cardinals imply that AD(A) holds for
sets of reals A defined by sufficiently simple topological properties, i.e be-
ing universally Baire; this suffices to prove that all universally Baire sets A
have all desirable regularity properties. Moreover AC and determinacy ar-
guments are both widely used in various branches of mathematics. Finally
AC and determinacy in its full strength contradict each other, but they co-
exist harmoniously provided one puts natural bounds, given by the notion
of universal Baireness, on the topological complexity of the sets for which
determinacy holds.
5.3. Generic absoluteness for second order arithmetic. In an unex-
pected turn of events a deep and fruitful connection between large cardinals
and forcing was then discovered by Woodin [35, Thm 3.3.13, Section 3.4].
Informally this result, which goes under the name of Generic absoluteness
for second order arithmetic, can be stated as follows.
Assume there are class many Woodin cardinals. Given a
mathematical problem formalizable in second order arith-
metic, if a solution can be established by means of forcing,
then that is the correct solution.
That is, if we accept large cardinal axioms, we can turn forcing into a
useful tool for proving direct implications rather than independence results.
Indeed, it is sufficient to show that forcing produces a structure where a
sentence formalizable in second order arithmetic holds, in order to turn this
consistency proof into a direct derivation of the given sentence from large
cardinal assumptions. In particular Woodin’s result rules out the possibility
to use forcing to prove the independence, from ZFC supplemented with large
cardinals, of any problem formalizable in second order arithmetic.
A vast portion of number theory, analysis, differential geometry, measure
theory, and probability theory can be expressed by sentences in second-order
arithmetics, hence for a great number of problems arising in these fields, we
to accept the axioms asserting the existence of Woodin cardinals on the basis of the same
“intrinsic” arguments.
45This family of sets can also be characterized topologically as the family of projective
sets i.e. those obtained by a Borel subset of (2N)n applying repeatedly either the operation
of projection on some coordinate or the operation of complementation.
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might try to use Woodin’s result directly and solve such problems establish-
ing the consistency of their solution by means of forcing; this approach is
taken for example in [6, 61].
6. Axioms able to settle CH.
There are many important ZFC-undecidable problems which cannot be
properly formalized in second order arithmetic. Woodin’s results cannot
apply to these problems. Among these we mention once again CH, White-
head’s problem on free groups, the existence or not of outer automorphism
of the Calkin algebra. This motivates the two programs we are about to dis-
cuss. Both propose to adopt stronger axioms able to give a unified picture
of a larger portion of the universe of sets; a portion large enough to include
almost all sets definable in third order arithmetic (i.e. expressible in the
first order structure (Vω+2,∈,=)). As a matter of fact, a unified theory of
this portion of the universe would give a solution to all problems mentioned
above.
The first program consists in a step by step strategy aimed at giving
a complete picture of larger and larger initial segments of the cumulative
hierarchy, with the goal of finding an analogue of Woodin’s absoluteness
result, first, for third order arithmetic, and then for more and more complex
initial segments of V . The second program tries to find global properties
able to give a general, detailed, picture of the whole universe of sets V , once
and for all.
6.1. Forcing axioms. Intuitively, forcing axioms tell us that the universe of
all sets has been saturated by means of the possibilities given by the method
of forcing. As a consequence we could think of a structure satisfying forcing
axioms as one obtained after many applications of forcing. Indeed this is
the rough idea behind their relative consistency proofs.
Mathematically, forcing axioms can be presented in several different ways.
The most common is to view them as generalizations of the Baire category
theorem BCT. Recall that BCT states that for any (locally) compact Haus-
dorff space X the intersection of countably many open dense subsets of X is
still dense, and therefore non empty. On the other hand it is not hard to find
uncountable collections of dense open subsets of R with empty intersection,
for example ⋂
x∈R
(R \ {x}) = ∅.
A more sophisticated example is the following. Consider the one point com-
pactification X = ℵ1∪{∗} of the space ℵ1, endowed with the discrete topol-
ogy. Take the compact Hausdorff space XN with the product topology. The




Eα is empty. Indeed any g belonging to this intersection would
be a surjection of the countable set N onto the uncountable set ℵ1 ∪ {∗},
but such a g clearly cannot exist.
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Forcing axioms can be defined as suitable strengthenings of BCT:
Given a cardinal λ and a topological spaceX, FAλ(X) holds
46
if any family of λ-many dense open subsets of X has a non-
empty intersection.
Therefore BCT is the statement that FAℵ0(X) holds for all locally compact
Hausdorff spaces X. On the other hand the above examples show that
FAℵ1(X) must fail for some compact space X. Nonetheless one of the driving
questions which led the research in set theory during the past decades has
been to isolate the largest class of compact Hausdorff spaces X for which
FAℵ1(X) can possibly hold. This would offer a forcing axiom able to settle
a vast number of mathematical problems at once. Indeed, a long list of
striking independence results were proved by showing that one solution to
the problem holds in L, while its negation can be proved using the fact
that FAℵ1(X) holds for certain compact spaces X. More specifically, using
forcing, it was possible to produce a model of ZFC where FAℵ1(X) was
true for the compact spaces X in question. For example this has been a
successful strategy to prove the independence of all the problems mentioned
at the beginning of this section.
Shelah, Magidor and Foreman [19] isolated a property of compact Haus-
dorff spaces X, that of being47 stationary set preserving (noted SSP(X)),
which is provably in ZFC a necessary condition in order for FAℵ1(X) to hold;
but they were also able to show that this can also be a sufficient condition.
Indeed, if a supercompact cardinal exists, then there is a model of ZFC such
that the following holds:
(MM) For X compact Hausdorff, FAℵ1(X) if and only if SSP(X).
This principle is known in the literature as Martin’s Maximum, and predi-
cates that FAℵ1(X) holds for the largest possible family of locally compact
Hausdorff spaces X, giving a maximal topological strengthening of BCT.
Forcing axioms can also be presented as natural strengthenings of AC:
(X, τ) is < λ-closed if whenever {Ai : i ∈ I} ⊆ τ is a family
of size less than λ of non-empty open sets linearly ordered
by inclusion, then
⋂
i∈I Ai contains a non-empty open set.
Notice that R with the euclidean topology is not < ℵ1-closed. On the
other hand this is the case for the space 2ℵ1 with bounded topology, which
46FAλ stands for Forcing Axiom for λ-sized families of dense open sets.
47C ⊆ ω1 is a club if it contains the supremum of all its countable subsets; S ⊆ ω1
is stationary if it meets all the club subsets of ω1. SSP(X) holds if letting B be the
complete booolean algebra given by regular open subsets of X and S be a stationary
subset of ω1, the forcing notion associated to B preserves the stationarity of S, i.e. —
following the boolean valued approach to forcing given (for example) in [59]— we have
that JŠ is stationary KB = 1B.
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is the topology generated by taking as a base the sets Ns = {f ∈ 2ℵ1 : f ⊇ s}
as s ranges over the functions in 2α, and α among the ordinals in ℵ1.
Let Γλ denote the class of compact Hausdorff spaces which are < λ-closed.
Goldblatt in [24] noted that AC is equivalent to the assertion that
(1) For all cardinals λ FAλ(X) holds for all X in Γλ.
It is possible to check that < ℵ1-closed Hausdorff compact spaces are
stationary set preserving and it is immediate to check that all compact
Hausdorff spaces are < ℵ0-closed. With this in mind, BCT is the weakening
of AC obtained by requiring (1) to hold just in case λ = ℵ0, while MM is an
optimal strenghtening of (1) for λ = ℵ1.
Finally let us mention that there are also generic absoluteness results
for third order arithmetic which follow from forcing axioms, as well as nice
model theoretic properties for the models of these axioms. In a very pre-
cise sense, there are natural strenghtenings of Martin’s Maximum, which
are consistent relative to large cardinal axioms, and produce generic abso-
luteness results for third order arithmetic [62, 60, 1]. This is a surprising
and strong analogy with Woodin’s result that large cardinals give generic
absoluteness for second order arithmetic. Moreover it is possible to give a
very nice picture, inspired by model theoretic arguments, of the family of
first order models of these axioms [58].
These absoluteness results for third order arithmetic give a logical expla-
nation of the success forcing axioms have met in solving problems of that
complexity. Indeed, MM implies that |R| = ℵ2, decides negatively White-
head problems, and forces all automorphism of the Calkin algebra to be
inner. The list of problems which are independent with respect to ZFC, and
are solved assuming MM, is long and stretches from general topology, to
functional analysis, algebra, and group theory; a non-exhaustive sample can
be found in [44, 45]. Moreover MM implies that the Axiom of Determinacy
holds for projective sets of reals.
Another argument in favor of forcing axioms is the following. There are
a few nice examples of theorems (see for example [54]) discovered assuming
forcing axioms and later obtained without these extra-assumptions, exactly
as it occurred for Borel determinacy with respect to large cardinal axioms.
The possibility to discover new theorems is of course a good argument in
favor of a new principle and, as noted before, assimilates justification in set
theory to that of empirical sciences.
We can sum up the current situation of this first program as follows. Forc-
ing axioms, such as MM, are non-constructive principles which are natural
strenghtenings of Baire’s category theorem and of AC; these axioms give
strong effective means to settle problems formalizable in third order arith-
metic. These means are also complemented by generic absoluteness results
for third order arithmetic. The situation mirrors to a large extent that of
second order arithmetic, in which AD and large cardinal axioms give strong
31
means to answer many questions formalizable in second order arithmetic
and are complemented by Woodin’s generic absoluteness results.
However almost nothing is known on what the forcing axioms for fourth
order arithmetic could be, or—more or less equivalently—what the largest
class of compact Hausdorff spaces X for which FAℵ2(X) holds could be. An
exhaustive non-technical account on these matters can be found in [62].
Finally let us mention that there are also philosophical arguments that ar-
gue for a conceptual similarity between the notion of genericity connected to
the method of forcing and the notion of quasi-combinatorialism introduced
by Bernays [4], in discussing the foundations of set theory. In this context
it is argued that forcing axioms are principles giving a precise mathematical
instantiation of the, necessarily vague, notion of arbitrary set connected to
quasi-combinatorialism [18, 57, 17].
6.2. Ultimate-L. An alternative program, orthogonal to forcing axioms, is
proposed by Woodin and goes under the name of Ultimate-L. The strategy
of the Ultimate-L program is not meant to offer a step-by-step completion
of the theories of the initial segments of the universe of all sets, but instead
aims at finding properties that could offer a global, detailed, picture of V .
The starting point is the observation that assuming V = L one gets a
nice “complete” picture of the universe of sets. For example all problems
mentioned in this paper which are undecidable on the basis of ZFC gets
an answer assuming V = L, that is CH holds, all Whitehead groups are
free, there are outer automorphisms of the Calkin algebra, etc. However
the axiom V = L has serious drawbacks, in particular it is not compatible
with all large cardinal axioms. This is the content of a theorem proved
by Scott in 1961 [48] on the non existence of measurable—or Woodin, or
supercompact, and all stronger—cardinals in L. It is also possible to show
the incompatibility of L with the generic absoluteness results which follow
from large cardinals. Indeed in L there are projective sets which do not
have the Baire property, are not Lebesgue measurable, and do not have the
perfect set property. Moreover it is possible to produce forcing extensions
of L which give a different solution, with respect to the one computed in L,
to problems formalizable in second order arithmetic.
Roughly speaking Woodin’s program aims to devise a more comprehensive
version of Gödel’s constructible universe L; the so-called Ultimate-L. The
aim is to produce a model of set theory which retains the nice features of L,
and avoids its unpleasant drawbacks. The definition of Ultimate-L and its
analysis requires a technical background in set theory far above the threshold
we put on this expository paper, hence our description of this program will
be elusive, and will just try to give some basic ideas.
In the model Ultimate-L one retains the fine analysis of the universe of
all sets offered by L. In particular its definition can be given by a highly
constructive procedure, much in the same way as it occurs for L. A key
role in the definition/construction of Ultimate-L is played once again by
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universally Baire sets. These are instrumental in the definition of the struc-
tures HODL(A,R), where the parameter A stands for a universally Baire set.
L(A,R) is the model obtained by closing off with respect to Gödel operations
the class Ord ∪ R ∪ {A}, and HODL(A,R) is the ZFC-model given by hered-
itarily ordinal definable sets48 in L(A,R). Woodin’s program is centered
around the following axiom, called V = Ultimate-L.
There are a proper class of Woodin cardinals49. Moreover,
whenever ϕ is a sentence holding in an initial segment of the
cumulative hierarchy of V , there is a universally Baire set A
such that ϕ holds in some initial segment of HODL(A,R).
Under V = Ultimate-L, Woodin offered a complete and detailed picture
of the structure of the universe of all sets, much alike the picture one gets
by analyzing the constructible universe L. In particular CH holds in any
structure satisfying this principle. The axiom V = Ultimate-L computes also
the solution of many, if not all, of the undecidable problems mentioned
in this paper, in most cases providing an answer opposite to that given
by forcing axioms. Woodin’s axiom also gives a global description of V ,
entailing that V = HOD, i.e. V is equal to the the class of hereditarily
ordinal definable sets of V . Moreover, it can also be argued that Ultimate-L
satisfies a minimality property similar to that of Gödel’s L, since another
non-trivial property of Woodin’s axiom is that V cannot be obtained by
forcing over some smaller submodel.
The name Ultimate-L is evocative, but its appropriateness still depends on
the possibility to show its compatibility with large cardinal axioms. This is
the content of the so called V = Ultimate-L conjecture. A positive solution
of this conjecture would be, in Woodin’s opinion, the culmination of an
important line of research, called Inner model program, which tries to build
canonical models of set theory that display similarities with L, but that
nonetheless are compatible with all known large cardinals.
The V = Ultimate-L conjecture is still open, although there are speculative
arguments suggesting that it might not be possible to prove it. Indeed, the
following interesting connection between large cardinals and Cohen’s forcing
method has been observed. Namely, if from large cardinal axioms it can
be proved that a sentence is forcibly necessary, then it is often the case
that higher large cardinals can prove that the same sentence holds in V .
For a sentence ϕ, being forcibly necessary means that we can use forcing
to build a model of ZFC where ϕ holds, and such that we cannot apply
forcing once again, over that model, in order to falsify ϕ. An example
48X ∈ L(A,R) is ordinal definable in L(A,R) if there is a formula φ(x, y) and an ordinal
α such that L(A,R) |= φ(X,α) and L(A,R) |= ∃!xφ(x, α). X ∈ L(A,R) is hereditarily
ordinal definable in L(A,R) if X and all the elements in its transitive closure are ordinal
definable in L(A,R).
49This is a technical requirement in order to obtain all regularity properties for the
universally Baire sets.
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of this phenomenon is given by the sentence asserting that all projective
sets are Lebesgue measurable. Indeed, assuming the existence of a strong
cardinal, this sentence is forcibly necessary, while assuming the existence of
infinitely many Woodin cardinals it is just true; notice that if δ is a Woodin
cardinal (Vδ,∈,=) models that there is a strong cardinal. Now, it has been
shown that under large cardinals the negation of V = Ultimate-L is forcibly
necessary. Therefore, if the phenomenon we described above generalizes, it
could give means to disprove the V = Ultimate-L conjecture. Of course these
are just mere speculations, only actual proofs can give definite answers.
In our opinion if the V = Ultimate-L conjecture is true, there are good
“extrinsic” reasons to accept Woodin’s axiom V = Ultimate-L, given the nice
picture of the universe of sets it provides, its ability to settle almost all ques-
tions which remain undecidable on the basis of ZFC, and its compatibility
with large cardinal axioms.
It is unclear at this stage if these two programs can succeed and, if so,
whether they will be able to refute each other beyond any reasonable doubt,
or coexist harmoniously as it occurred finally for the Axiom of Choice and
Determinacy hypotheses. What is striking is the effort of both programs
in keeping up with Hilbert’s rationalistic belief in the possibility to find a
clear solution to all mathematical problems. This belief, far from being an
unjustified hope, represents in our opinion the very essence of the study of
the infinite; contrary to Kronecker’s dictum, this study has proved to be
fruitful and rewarding.
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